A major challenge to reduce forest loss in the tropics is to incentivize conservation on private land in agricultural settings. Engaging private landowners in conservation schemes is particularly important along deforestation frontiers, such as in the southern Brazilian Amazon. While we know much about what motivates landowners to participate as providers, or sellers, of conservation schemes, understanding what motivates landowners who act as buyers, that is, those who require land to meet conservation obligations, remains lacking. Here we identify viewpoints of sellers and buyers of an emerging forest certificate trading scheme in Brazil and quantify the compatibility of their views to examine potential barriers to trade. Sellers and buyers could be divided into three groups, but only one group in each case was positive about participating in the scheme. A key concern of buyers was the desire for establishing contracts with a long duration; in contrast, price was a key issue for sellers. Addressing these concerns by defining minimum contract lengths and restricting the spatial scale of transactions will be essential if this scheme is to realise its potential to reduce rates of deforestation.
Introduction
The historical depletion of the natural environment (Gibbons et al. 2016 ) has led to the emergence of a wide variety of market-based conservation instruments. These schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al. 2015) . Worldwide, forest conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). Here, landowners receive payments from an institution (e.g., government, NGO, collective fund) to provide certain environmental goods or services, such as carbon storage/sequestration (Kosoy et al. 2008; Borner et al. 2017) . Other recent schemes involve establishing markets for land, such as Tradable Development Rights, biodiversity offsets and habitat banking (Santos et al. 2015) . These promote trade between private actors as "buyers" and "sellers" of environmental goods/services, potentially reconciling the trade-off between development and conservation (Ring et al. 2010 ). All such schemes rely on voluntary engagement of private landowners as an important factor to deliver long-lasting conservation gains (Kosoy et al. 2008; Yeboah et al. 2015) .
In many conservation schemes, participation of rural landowners has been largely linked to sociodemographic factors: better-off, well-educated, and owners of larger plots of land are more inclined to participate, whereas age and gender are not determinant factors (Pagiola et al. 2010; Ma et al. 2012; Lastra-Bravo et al. 2015) . Less is known, however, about how programme-specific factors influence landowners' participation (Greiner & Gregg 2011; Yeboah et al. 2015) . Additionally, the possibility that sellers and buyers might have different perceptions on programme-specific factors and be influenced by them in different ways is typically disregarded in the analysis of conservation schemes (Bastian et al. 2017; Zabala et al. 2017) . For instance, long contracts and lack of information tend to be obstacles for sellers (Page & Bellotti 2015; Yeboah et al. 2015) . In contrast, a scheme that has clear conservation potential often encourages the participation of those landowners who have a positive environmental attitude (Greiner & Gregg 2011; Bremer et al. 2014; Kwayu et al. 2014) . High payment value can also encourage landowners to participate and forgo opportunity costs, but it is not always the main reason for their enrolment (Kosoy et al. 2008; Bremer et al. 2014; Page & Bellotti 2015) . Overall, understanding the influence of these programme-specific factors on the uptake of conservation schemes is important, as they can be modified by policy interventions.
Accounting for the perceptions of buyers and sellers within conservation schemes is particularly urgent in areas under high and increasing deforestation pressure and land-use change, such as at the deforestation frontier in tropical forest landscapes (Nordhagen et al. 2017; Zabala et al. 2017) . Some tropical countries have incorporated conservation incentives into their environmental policies through protection of forest within private land (Borner et al. 2016) . For example, Brazil, with the world's largest tropical forest, has invested in a variety of strategies to halt deforestation, which resulted in a 70% decline in forest loss from 2005 to 2013 (Nepstad et al. 2014) , although deforestation has risen more recently (Tollefson 2016) . In particular, the Brazilian Forest Code has introduced a promising strategy-the Environmental Reserve Quota (Portuguese acronym, CRA; see SI for details)-that could potentially avoid the deforestation and degradation of native vegetation across a wide range of biomes (Soares-Filho et al. 2016) . The CRA is a mechanism of tradable forest certificates in which private landowners can trade hectares of native standing forest (Bernasconi et al. 2016) . This article aims to explore the diversity and agreement between potential sellers and buyers' perceptions of programme-specific factors within CRA (e.g., contract length, price, intermediaries, trust, information) and identify factors that result in sharp divergences between sellers and buyers that could potentially affect trade.
Methods
The Brazilian Forest Code states that private landowners must set aside areas of native vegetation within their farmland. Those who have deforested these set-aside areas (hereafter "Legal Reserve"; LR) above the maximum permitted may compensate for their deficit by acquiring hectares from landowners who have LR surplus. Noncompliant landowners are also given other options, such as: (1) buy and/or register another property with LR surplus; (2) acquire private areas pending tenure regularization inside publically owned protected areas and donate to the Environmental Agency; (3) allow natural recovery or reforestation of the area (Brasil 2012 ). Another key piece of the Forest Code that will help monitor CRA trades is the rural registry system, which is still to be finalized. Under this system, landowners must register and georeference their land, to promote transparency and compliance (May et al. 2015) .
Study location
Mato Grosso is the third largest state in Brazil and has extensive coverage by the Amazon, Cerrado and Pantanal biomes (Figure 1 ). Since the early 1990s, Mato Grosso has experienced high rates of deforestation, mainly driven by expansion in pasture and soybean plantations (Brando et al. 2013) . Private properties in Mato Grosso occupy 73 (of 90) Mha and nearly 22% (16 Mha) of native vegetation was cleared between 1990 and 2012 (Brando et al. 2013) . Across the state as a whole, around 5.6 Mha of native vegetation within private land have been deforested above the maximum permitted (Soares-Filho et al. 2014) . There should, therefore, be considerable demand from landowners to "buy" forest credits in order to meet their legal obligations (Soares-Filho et al. 2014) . Nevertheless, there are also landowners who retain set-aside areas which exceed the minimum required who could, therefore, act as sellers. This makes Mato Grosso a large potential market for CRA trades (Soares-Filho et al. 2016) , once the Forest legislation is fully enforced and the CRA is regulated.
Assessing willingness to participate in CRA
We used Q-methodology to explore the diversity of opinions of buyers and sellers regarding the CRA programme (details in SI). Q-methodology identifies and clusters individuals according to distinct perceptions of a topic (Watts & Stenner 2012) . Our main objective was to assess different opinions on CRA, and Q-methodology enables an exploratory narrative of these opinions via a systematic and quantitative analysis (Zabala & Pascual 2016) .
Between June and August 2016 we contacted farmers within the sampled municipalities (Figure 1) 39 statements representing possible opinions on CRA programme-specific factors and asked to sort these onto a grid which represents their level of disagreement or agreement, namely Q-sort ( Figure SI1 ). Twenty-seven statements were identical to both groups, five were similar with opposing meanings (Table 1 ) and seven were specific to either sellers or buyers (Tables 2 and 3) . We built statements and thematic categories (contract length, price, intermediaries, trust, transaction costs, payment vehicle, information, ecoeffectiveness and demotivation) based on literature review and interviews with key actors (details in SI). All statements were pilot-tested with six landowners prior to application with participants. Besides the application of Q methodology, socio-demographic and farm-specific information were collected.
In spite of our efforts to cover a variety of land-uses, farm sizes, and demographic profiles (Table 4) , landowners who are remotely-based and nonaffiliated to any organization are likely undersampled. However, our final sample reflects the main characteristics of Mato Grosso's agriculture: large landholdings (>1,000 ha) dominated by pasture and soybean Godar et al. 2015) .
Data analysis
Q-sorts from buyers and sellers were analyzed separately using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and varimax rotation in R package "qmethod" (Zabala 2014) . The analysis provides representative groups of participants who share similar views about CRA. The final product of the analysis is an idealized sorting distribution of statement scores (hereafter "normalized factor scores") ranging between -4 (strongly disagree) and +4 (strongly agree), corresponding to the view of a hypothetical best representative participant of each group; and the statements that are statistically distinguishable to groups of sellers or buyers for p < 0.05 (Zabala 2014) . To ease subsequent calculations, we negate the buyers normalized factor scores for statements with opposing meaning between the two groups (Table 1) .
Measuring trade compatibility between buyers and sellers
To assess whether buyers and sellers have similar views about programme-specific factors that could indicate a The longer the contract the lower the price should be. NA NA NA (−)3 (−)1 (−)4 * † The normalized factor scores of these statements were negated to ease calculations using Equation (1).
potential trade, we develop a Trade Compatibility Index (TCI) for each combination of buyer and seller category across all statements (details in SI), based on significant differences in normalized factor scores. TCI is calculated for a particular pair of sellers and buyers as derived from the PCA analysis. The lower the TCI, the more compatible a pair is in their perceptions (i.e., more similar Q-sort). More formally, we define TCI as:
where S i is the normalized factor score for statement i for sellers and B i is the normalized factor score for statement i for buyers. p X i equals 1 if the respective statement was given a significantly different score (p < 0.05) by a group, when pairwise compared to scores given by other groups. If not significant, p X i equals 0. This is to ensure that only statements that were distinct to define how a group "thinks" were included in the calculations. The constant C ensures TCI range from 0 to 1 (here C = 8; C is the sum of minimum and maximum absolute values of normalized factor scores). We calculated TCI for each pair of sellers and buyers, starting with statements set {s } belonging to the contract thematic category, and added other thematic categories to the statements set in a stepwise fashion (details in SI). 
Results
PCA analyses revealed three groups of sellers and three of buyers (total explained variance 44% and 46%, respectively). Q-methodology is designed to capture the diverse viewpoints from a relatively small sample size (Zabala & Pascual 2016) . Thus, the number of assigned sellers and buyers to each group (Table 4 ) cannot be used as an accurate measure of their relative proportion within the overall landowners population. Of the 35 potential sellers interviewed, four were not representative of any of the three groups, while of the 24 potential buyers, only one was not representative (all identified via automatic flagging; details in SI). Hence, they were not considered in subsequent analyses.
Sellers
A lack of awareness about their responsibilities (statement 12 for sellers, hereafter denoted S12) was a consensus statement among sellers. Sellers also collectively agreed that transaction costs should be included in CRA price per hectare (S37) and that CRA should have a fiscal incentive (S27). Beyond these areas of consensus, three groups of sellers were identified.
Independent conservationists (group A)
Ideas of conservation provoked strong feelings for these landowners. They not only agreed that CRA can be a good conservation scheme to significantly protect forests at a large scale (S4, S5), but are also eager to conserve regardless of an economic incentive (S6). Predominantly composed of small landowners, 29% rely exclusively on growing fruits and vegetables as their main land-use (Table 4) .
Their mean LR is the lowest of the sellers (Table 4) , but this does not alter their perception that CRA could be a way to receive income for their LR (S34). Price (S28) was important, and for them it should vary according to forgone opportunity costs, even though they do not wish to deforest their land. "With or without CRA the forest must be preserved. Our consciousness does not let us do any type of deforestation," said one independent conservationist in his interview.
This group was strongly motivated to take part in CRA as they disagreed with statements on potential barriers (S24, S31). However, they require more information to facilitate their engagement (S8). They do not anticipate deforesting their LR surplus in the near future (S33) and consider a 10-year contract period to be a good option (S2).
Environmental disbelievers (group B)
Although attributing importance to conservation (S4, S33), this group does not believe that CRA will help protect forests (S5). They distrust negotiation with other landholders (S22) and do not wish to create opportunities to build trust (S23), indicating reluctance to be involved at all. Even a higher price (S30) per hectare did not influence their distrust in CRA, or in other landowners. Additionally, they do not see any reason to participate (S24). They recognize the importance of intermediaries in facilitating trade (S16) and are aware that this can have an impact on pricing (S14) but were unconcerned about the other roles intermediaries might have (S13, S17, S35). Long-term and perpetual contracts are unthinkable (S3, S36) and the potential CRA returns were not important (S20, S28, S32). Table 4 Summary information about sellers and buyers (covering landholder and farm characteristics) and respective explained variances for each grouping identified as part of the Q analysis: A represents independent conservationists; B environmental disbelievers; C willing deforesters; D CRA outsiders; E cautious buyers; and F compensation seekers.
Sellers
Buyers (Howard et al. 2016) . b Most of the areas registered in CAR (rural database system) for MT are greater than 1,000 hectares (Godar et al. 2015) .
Willing Deforesters (group C)
Price is all that matters to this group. CRA should provide the same financial return as productive land (S20, S28), regardless of its potential to protect native standing forests (S4, S5). How this potential monetary return will reach them does not matter (S18, S19). They do not perceive that complete deforestation is necessarily a poor outcome (S6) and would be willing to deforest their LR surplus (S33), suggesting they have no intrinsic motivation to conserve. They see CRA rules as too complicated (S9) and limited to specific groups of landowners (S31, S38). Interestingly, they were neutral about long-term and perpetual contracts (S3, S26). CRA is simply not seen as a profitable investment (S34). This will act as a barrier to them entering the market as they will favour more profitable land-uses, such as cattle or agriculture.
Buyers
Lack of awareness about their responsibilities was also consensus among buyers (B12) and, in general, buyers did not attribute much importance to being uninformed about CRA. It was also a consensus that CRA prices per hectare should not be higher than non-productive land prices (B29).
CRA outsiders (group D)
This group wants to be exempted from their environmental liability for a competitive price, preferably without any responsibilities for land management (statement 37 for buyers, hereafter denoted B37). They are very production-driven and would not promote any sort of environmental conservation activity if it meant a loss of productive land (B38, B39). CRA seems to be an odd and unfair compensation strategy to them. It involves making regular payments for a forest certificate that will never be theirs and has an "expiry date." Interestingly, from our interviews with them, we learned that half of this group had recently acquired private land in areas designated by the government for conservation-the so called public conservation units. For them, to have somebody (the seller) managing a forested land for them is not a rational decision. They prefer to delegate this responsibility to the government (B36, B37) and are not prepared to consider any of the contract lengths proposed (B1, B2, B3, B26). In their own words: "The whole society should pay to maintain forest inside farms as the big urban centres also depend on clean air and water. To make this as an exclusive expense on the farmer is unfair."
Cautious buyers (group E)
As opposed to the other buyers, this group understands the conservation value of their LR (B6). They believe CRA has conservation potential (B4) but not at a large scale (B5). To ensure reliable negotiations they like to take the lead and are unwilling to go through intermediaries (B15). This is illustrated by their preference to visit a seller's property to minimize risks (B23) and to engender trust in the negotiation (B22). Perpetual contracts are the only contract duration that would be agreeable (B26).
They are concerned about the longevity of CRA and stability of the Forest Code (B25), leaving them disinclined to participate (B24). They did not think they would participate in the market as: (i) they would rather acquire another forested farm in order to meet their obligations, rather than use CRA (B36) and (ii) in contrast with other buyers, they feel that active reforestation on their own land remains a possible strategy to recover their forest deficit (B39).
Compensation seekers (group F)
This group was the most willing to enter in CRA market, but their participation would be conditional on long-term contracts (B1, B2, B3, B26). They declined other compliance options (B36, B38, B39) and are indifferent about acquiring land in conservation units (B37). They see the conservation potential in CRA (B4, B5) and are positive about the success of the scheme (B10). However, a competitive price is important to guarantee their long-term participation (B28, B32). As they are seeking a perpetual contractual commitment, they seek the lowest price per hectare and trusting an unknown landowner is not an issue (B22, B23, B35).
Trade Compatibility Index (TCI)
Pairs of buyers and sellers were not substantially incompatible regarding CRA programme-specific factors (Figure 2 ). The overall TCI (i.e., including all thematic categories) for the most compatible pair (independent conservationists and compensation seekers: AF) was 0.167 on the scale of 0-1 (low TCI values indicate strong agreement; high values indicate strong disagreement for all t c a r t n o C e c i r P e c i r P + t c a r t n o C s e i r a i d e m r e t n I + (1)) for each pair of sellers and buyers. The darker the cell, the more compatible the pair. The thematic categories were included in the model step-wise left to right. For A-F titles, see caption in Table 4 . To assess overall compatibility, sorting was made according to right-most column, which is the one including all thematic categories.
statements in common). The most incompatible pair, willing deforesters and compensation seekers (CF), had a TCI of 0.417. TCI overall results suggest that willing deforesters, as the most incompatible group of sellers, is unlikely to engage in a trade. Although environmental disbelievers (B) showed high compatibility with two groups of buyers (TCI = 0.175 and 0.232), they clearly stated their disinterest in CRA. Apart from pairing up successfully (TCI = 0.167) with independent conservationists, compensation seekers were the most incompatible group of buyers (TCI range = 0.4-0.417). Ironically, they were the only group of buyers who considered participating in CRA. Analysing how TCI values vary among different categories of factors allows us to identify the causes of particularly high agreement or disagreement between groups. For example, TCI values for contract length only are particularly high (e.g., TCI = 0.625) between environmental disbelievers and compensation seekers (BF), and the latter and willing deforesters (CF), as compensation seekers have a strong preference for long or perpetual contracts. For independent conservationists and compensation seekers (AF), contract length was not significant, in spite of independent conservationists' disagreement with perpetual contracts (S26). However, when the TCI values were based only on price, AF had a relatively high TCI (0.438). When statements about other thematic categories were included, the incompatibility decreased suggesting price was the main point of disagreement between them.
Discussion
Differences among landowners must be considered in the design of market-based conservation instruments as we show that perceptions of programme-specific factors vary widely among potential groups of sellers and buyers. In the case of CRA, not all sellers were equally inclined to participate and not all buyers saw CRA as a good compensation strategy. Two programme factors in particular played a major role in determining compatibility between buyers and sellers: contract length and price.
Sellers prefer short-term contracts, as they associate long-term agreements with land management restrictions and the potential to miss future advantageous opportunities. In analogous programmes, such as PES and conservation easements, long-term and perpetual contracts discouraged the participation and permanence of sellers (Sorice et al. 2013; Yeboah et al. 2015; Bastian et al. 2017) . Our results corroborate these findings as potential CRA sellers are reluctant to accept long-term contracts. In contrast, we found that buyers have a strong preference for long-term or perpetual agreements. Many buyers, therefore, might choose to acquire and donate private land inside conservation units. In Mato Grosso, these areas represent 800,000 ha in the Amazon and 50,000 ha in Cerrado (Andrade et al. 2013) , which would cover a portion of the estimated LR deficit of 3.9 and 1.6 Mha in Amazon and Cerrado, respectively (Soares-Filho et al. 2014) .
Despite the fact that some buyers, such as CRA outsiders, are likely to meet their Forest Code obligations by purchasing land in conservation units, Amazon and Cerrado would still have 3.1 and 1.1 Mha of demand left, respectively, which could result in successful CRA trades. Sellers willing to participate, such as independent conservationists, are well-placed to trade with compensation seekers, if issues around contract length can be resolved. To encourage this match, CRA regulation could set a minimum of 10 to 15-year contracts to ensure medium-term supply of forest certificates and to provide a middle-ground for sellers and buyers. This time-frame is widely adopted in analogous schemes (Lennox & Armsworth 2011) and contributes to an increased likelihood of future re-enrolment (Ando & Chen 2011) .
Another important issue policy-makers need to address is how to make CRA more attractive to unwilling sellers like willing deforesters-landowners who clearly stated an intention of legally deforesting their LR surplus. If this land could be brought into CRA, the potential gains for the area of land under protection could be huge. In Mato Grosso, nearly 1.6 and 4 Mha, in the Amazon and Cerrado, respectively, could face legal deforestation. For willing deforesters, who are more profit-driven, price will likely play an important role. Because their parcels are located in regions of high opportunity costs, buyers will prefer trading with low-cost areas under no imminent deforestation pressure. A potential strategy to address issues around price is to restrict the spatial scale of trade (May et al. 2015) . If trade could be constrained subregionally within the state, potentially restricted to areas under similar deforestation pressure, surpluses owned by willing deforesters could be brought into the market. Spatially restricted trade appears as an effective measure to achieve conservation gains both in CRA (Bernasconi et al. 2016) and in PES schemes (Sattler et al. 2013; Grima et al. 2016) .
Our findings provide empirical evidence of how different perceptions on programme-specific factors can become substantial barriers to sellers and buyers engaging in trading land. To overcome these barriers, we suggest (1) establishing minimum contract durations and (2) restricting the spatial scale of trade to resolve issues around price and target specific landowner groups, are important policy recommendations that could minimize barriers to trade and improve chances of success. In addition, law enforcement and transparent monitoring should not be overlooked by regulators.
This study provides insights that are generally applicable in contexts where peer-to-peer schemes are promoted to avoid further forest conversion. In settings that provide similar preconditions in terms of environmental policies and land tenure, it is likely that many buyers will also prefer perpetual solutions, whereas sellers will prefer short-term contracts to avoid long-term commitments. In addition, landowners' heterogeneous perceptions about a given scheme should be considered, in order to target policy interventions to specific groups that are not likely to participate. The Trade Compatibility Index, as a novel and generally applicable methodological step, allows a systematic comparison between groups, emphasizing trade potentialities and key programme-specific factors that could be points of concern. Designing policies that are sensitive to the intended audience is likely to be critical to ensure that conservation interventions achieve their goals.
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